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While the aging of  the population is a common  feature in  many industrial 
countries, the most striking feature in the case of Japan is the high speed at 
which the process is occurring. The reason for this is closely related to Japan’s 
rapid  economic  development,  which  has  triggered  equally  rapid  social 
changes, namely, falling fertility ratios and rising life expectancies. As a result, 
the ratio of elderly people-usually  defined as those who are age sixty-five or 
over-to  the working-age population (aged twenty to sixty-four) rose from .10 
in 1930 to .24 in 1995 and is projected to rise to .48 in 2025. This will lead to 
a large expansion of social expenditures in the coming decades. 
Japan’s social security expenditures in 1994 amounted to Y57 trillion, which 
was 11.9 percent of Japan’s GDP in that year, doubling its share of  GDP in the 
past twenty years. Public pension benefits accounted for a large share of total 
social  security  expenditures  (5  1.3 percent),  followed by  medical  insurance 
benefits (38.2 percent). Public pension benefits also account for over 50 per- 
cent of  the total family income of  the average household whose head is age 
sixty-five or over. Thus, like other industrial countries, the benefit structure of 
the public pension program is likely to have important effects on the retirement 
decisions of older persons. 
Nevertheless,  there  are  several  important characteristics  particular  to the 
case of  Japan. One is the high household saving rate, which was 13.2 percent 
of disposable income in 1994, compared with 3.8 percent in the United States. 
According to opinion polls, the major incentive (even among older persons) to 
save is preparing for retirement. Another characteristic is the high level of labor 
force participation (LFP) of  older persons. The average labor force participa- 
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tion ratios of males aged sixty to sixty-four and sixty-five to sixty-nine were 
75 and 54 percent,  respectively. The high labor force participation of  older 
persons in Japan is one factor behind the high levels of household saving as it 
is likely that people continue to save as long as they work. To what extent these 
high ratios of both labor force participation and savings on the part of  older 
persons in Japan are affected by the social security system remains a source of 
much controversy. 
The purpose of  our paper is to provide an overview of  the interaction be- 
tween social security (in particular, the public pension scheme) and the labor 
force behavior of  older persons in Japan. The structure of the paper is in line 
with that of  Diamond and Gruber (chap. 11 in this volume), who conduct a 
similar study for the US.  social security system. In section 6.1, we examine 
several key features of the labor market behavior of older persons with specific 
reference to the recent reversal of the previous trend toward earlier retirement. I 
In section 6.2, we describe the basic structure of the public pension system in 
Japan, focusing on the recent major changes in the institutional details con- 
cerning retirement  behavior. In  section 6.3, we estimate the social security 
wealth of the average employee in Japan and document the retirement incen- 
tives inherent in the current social security system. Finally, we discuss several 
country-specific social security and labor market issues that are closely related 
to social security wealth. 
6.1  The Labor Market Behavior of Older Persons 
One of the common features in the labor markets in many OECD countries 
in the postwar period, including Japan, has been the declining participation of 
older persons. In 1960, almost 70 percent of men aged sixty-five to sixty-nine 
were participating  in the labor force. By  1997, this figure had fallen to 53 
percent-a  figure that  is nevertheless  still high by  international  standards. 
There are various factors affecting these declines in labor market participation, 
among which  improvement in social security benefits is significant. In this 
section, we provide some background on the labor market behavior of  older 
persons. 
6.1.1  Historical Trends 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the historical trends of the labor force participation 
rates of men and women from 1960 to 1996, respectively. For men, the labor 
force participation rates of  those aged sixty to sixty-four and sixty-five and 
above declined, while the rate for those aged forty-five to fifty-nine was virtu- 
ally flat. For women, the pattern is quite different-for  age groups younger 
1. What retirement means in Japan is usually retirement from the primary firm  in which one 
used to work for a long time and not necessarily retirement from the labor market per se. Many 
older Japanese persons continue to work after mandatory retirement from the primary firm,  moving 
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Fig. 6.2  Historical trends of labor force participation rates of women 
than sixty, labor force participation increased, while, for age groups over sixty, 
the trend toward earlier retirement dominates-although  the changes are much 
less pronounced than in the case of men. 
This decline in the labor force participation rates of older persons in Japan 
is mainly due to the declining share of the self-employed and improved pension 
benefits. In the postwar period, the share of the self-employed (including un- 242  Naohiro Yashiro and Takashi Oshio 
paid family workers) among total workers fell from 47 to 18 percent between 
1960 and 1996. This is mainly due to the decline of the agricultural sector and 
the migration of the population from rural to urban areas. However, in  1996, 
the share of the self-employed among total employment was still 3.5  and 57 
percent in the age groups sixty to sixty-four and sixty-five or above, respec- 
tively, partly accounting for the high labor market attachment of older persons. 
As the average labor market participation of the self-employed is higher than 
that of employees, the shrinking self-employed sector is one factor behind the 
falling average labor force participation ratios. Another factor behind the de- 
cline in labor force participation is an increasing trend toward greater pension 
benefits (see below). 
As for the participation ratio in  the pension  plans, enrollment  in a public 
pension plan is compulsory for everyone in the workforce, including the self- 
employed. However, whereas the social security premiums of  employees are 
automatically  deducted from wages along with taxes, about 30 percent  (ex- 
cluding those who are exempted from paying premiums) of  the self-employed 
and other nonemployees do not participate in a pension plan, a situation due 
mainly to the lack of  an enforcement  mechanism. Also, the public  pension 
benefits of the self-employed have little effect on their labor force participation. 
This is because eligibility for benefits is not linked to retirement and because 
pension benefits are granted at age sixty-five and are not means tested. Also, 
the average benefit level is approximately one-quarter that for employees. The 
pension benefits of employees, however, are significantly higher and are sub- 
ject to an earnings test. Thus, with the rising share (53 percent of all workers 
in  1960, 84 percent in  1996) of employees, who are more affected by public 
pension policies, public pension benefits figure more importantly in the retire- 
ment decisions of older Japanese workers (fig. 6.3). 
6.1.2  Reversal of the Trend toward Earlier Retirement 
Another interesting feature of the labor force participation of older persons 
in Japan is the fact that the long-run pattern of decline reversed between  1988 
and  1993 and that participation  thereafter remained  steady at its  1993 level. 
This is particularly prominent among men aged sixty to sixty-four, but a simi- 
lar pattern is observed for the group aged sixty-five or over, too (see fig. 6.1 
above). Although many attribute older people’s high levels of labor market par- 
ticipation  in Japan to such supply-side factors as insufficient  social security 
benefits, such factors do not plausibly explain the reversal of the trend as Ja- 
pan’s social security benefits have not declined in comparison to earnings over 
time. A key cause of the reversal lies in demand. If we compare the labor force 
participation of men aged sixty to sixty-four and the unemployment rate of the 
same age group, reflecting the tightness of the labor market for older persons, 
the period of the increase in labor force participation also saw a falling unem- 
ployment rate. Estimating  the labor force participation of men aged sixty to 243  Social Security and Retirement in Japan 
Fig. 6.3  Share of employees in total employed 
sixty-four by adding the corresponding unemployment rate to the average re- 
placement ratio resulted in a better explanation of rising labor force participa- 
tion  in the late  1980s (fig. 6.4).' While the  strong demand for employment 
resulting  in  the rising  labor force participation  of  older persons  in the  late 
1980s was mainly due to cyclic factors, such demand may well be seen again 
in the near future. This is because the size of the working-age population (be- 
tween the ages of  fifteen and sixty-four) has already  started to shrink as of 
1995, and this trend is projected to continue through the twenty-first century: 
with a constant labor force participation rate for each age group, Japan's labor 
force will decline by  7.6 percent  in 2020 from the 1993 level. This overall 
decline in the labor force may well stimulate the labor force participation of 
older persons by providing them with good job opportunities. 
Figure 6.5 indicates social security replacement rates over time. The replace- 
ment ratio here is defined as the ratio of the monthly pension benefits  of a 
married couple in the representative public pension scheme for private-sector 
2. The OLS estimated results with and without the unemployment rate are as follows: 
LFP  =  88.18 -  0.311 replacement ratio,  R'  =  ,0775, 
(46.64) (-10.83) 
LFP  =  86.37 - 0.0852 replacement ratio - 1.896 unemployment rate,  R'  =  0.884 
(62.74) (-1.87)  (-5.58) 244  Naohiro Yashiro and Takashi Oshio 
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Fig. 6.5  Social security replacement rates (monthly earnings including bonus) 
employees to average monthly earnings, including biannual bonus payments. 
There was a sudden jump in  1974 when the public pension scheme was re- 
formed, including the introduction of wage indexation, resulting in a doubling 
of benefits in subsequent periods. After the 1980s, the replacement rates have 
increased steadily over time. 245  Social Security and Retirement in Japan 
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Fig. 6.6  Participation rates by age and sex (%) 
6.1.3  Recent Labor Market Behavior 
To obtain a more detailed understanding of the time pattern of labor force 
participation in recent years, we use the national census data for 1990. The 
national census asks all individuals in the country about their labor force par- 
ticipation at the time the survey is conducted. Also, this is the only survey that 
publishes labor force participation data broken down by age-by-age changes. 
The age pattern of participation for men and women is shown in figure 6.6. 
At age forty-five in 1990, the participation rate of men is close to full capacity, 
while only 70 percent of women worked. There is then a gradual decline for 
men until age fifty-five, at which point the pace accelerates. There is a sharp 
drop in participation at age sixty, which is the typical mandatory retirement 
age for major Japanese firms. But even after the mandatory retirement age, 
labor market attachment is relatively strong, and 32 percent of males still work 
even at age seventy-five. It  should be noted that, among elderly males, the 
share of the self-employed who are voluntary part-time workers is much higher 
than the male average (16 percent), accounting for 34 and 47 percent of total 
employment for the age groups sixty to sixty-four and sixty-five to sixty-nine, 
respectively. This implies that the actual capacity of human resources at older 
ages in Japan may well be overestimated if one accounts for their shorter work- 
ing hours. Participation falls more rapidly for women in their fifties than it 
does for men, although the pace is almost unchanged up to the eighties, with 
the result that the participation  gap between the genders closes beyond age 
sixty. As most older women in the labor market are self-employed, the manda- 
tory retirement system affects the participation of  women much less than it 
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6.7  Distribution of activities of men by age (%) 
Figure 6.7 shows in more detail the allocation of time among men as they 
age, dividing their activity status into employment, unemployment, and retire- 
ment. From the available  statistics, it is difficult to determine whether those 
who are not in the workforce are retired or simply not working. Thus, retired 
persons are considered to be those who are not in the labor force and do not 
either engage in household work, go to school, and seek jobs. This same exer- 
cise is repeated for women in figure 6.8. Particularly to be noted among Japa- 
nese women aged forty to fifty is the high ratio of homemakers; they account 
for a substantial portion even at age sixty and beyond. 
6.1.4  Income Sources of Older Persons 
In figure 6.9, we examine the public retirement incomes of older persons on 
the basis of the Basic Survey on People’s Life, conducted by the Ministry of 
Welfare. The figure shows the rate at which public pension and other public 
assistance mainly from the income maintenance program is received. Begin- 
ning at age sixty, the rate of collection  of  social security benefits  increases 
sharply, driven by the collection of the public pension, until it is over 90  percent 
for those over age sixty-five. Private pensions are not popular in Japan, partly 
because there are few tax incentives to encourage enrolling in such pensions. 
On the contrary, large lump-sum severance payments made at the time of re- 
tirement, a substitute for the firm pensions offered in the United States, play 
an important role in saving for retirement (for details, see the section below on 
country-specific practices). 
Private pensions have become  an important  source of retirement  income. 
The size of the accumulated assets of private pensions in the financial markets 247  Social Security and Retirement in Japan 
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exceeded that of  firm pensions in the  1990s even though the tax benefits are 
quite limited. While the official data on private pensions are scant, an ad hoc 
survey based on a small sample by  the Ministry of  Post and Telecommunica- 
tion indicates that the ratio of families having private pensions has risen over 
the last few years (fig. 6.10). 
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Fig. 6.11  Distribution of income by source 
between the ages of forty-five and seventy-five on the basis of the Basic Survey 
on People's Life. We consider the distribution of income across three sources: 
earnings, capital income, and public pensions. Earnings are the dominant 
source of family income until age sixty, accounting for about 80 percent of 
total household income. Beginning at age sixty, earnings decline, and public 
pensions grow as a major source of  the income of the elderly, accounting for 249  Social Security and Retirement in Japan 
about 80 percent of the total. It should be noted that these data on the incomes 
of elderly individuals are not available from the conventional household sur- 
veys, which are based on the age of the household’s head. More than half the 
elderly age sixty-five or over live with their relatives, including their children’s 
family, and the ratio is particularly high for the poor elderly. Thus, those who 
are economically dependent on their children tend to drop from the household 
surveys, leaving the relatively rich elderly as the head of the household in sta- 
tistics (Yashiro  1997). Also, even  when  an elderly individual maintains the 
position  of  the household’s head, the inclusion of  children’s earnings in the 
family income may  underestimate the role that pension benefits play in the 
total income of the elderly. Thus, an international comparison of the economic 
position of the elderly needs to account for the difference in family structure. 
6.2  Key Features of the Social Security System 
6.2.1  A History of the Social Security System in Japan 
The current public pension for private-sector employees originated from the 
Rodosha Nenkin Hokenhou (Pension Insurance for Workers) Act in 1942, fol- 
lowing the establishment of the National Health Insurance Act of  1938. Al- 
though the major purpose of social security insurance was to secure workers’ 
standard of living, such extensive social security reform was possible only in 
wartime,  when the government  needed all the manpower it could muster in 
exchange for an assurance that minimum  living  standards would  be main- 
tained. 
Japan’s social security program, which consists of public pension and health 
insurance  schemes  and  covers  everyone,  including  those  who  are  self- 
employed or not working, was established in 1961. Since then, the size of so- 
cial security expenditures increased at a much faster pace than did the econ- 
omy as a whole, growing from 4.9 percent of national income in 1960 to 14.1 
percent in 1996. A major reform of social security occurred in 1973. The pen- 
sion reform included the introduction of automatic increases in benefits with 
increases in inflation and wages: monthly pension benefit levels are set at 60 
percent of wages when the funding scheme is fully matured, and revaluation 
of the benefit levels occurs every five years; benefits are also adjusted annually 
to keep pace with increases in the CPI. Also, there is a scheme providing spe- 
cial benefits for the elderly who have not contributed long enough to receive 
pension benefits.  On the other hand, the health  insurance  scheme was also 
reformed mainly to improve benefits. Medical costs covered by  health insur- 
ance have increased from 50 to 70-90  percent of the total. Also, 100 percent 
of expensive medical care is covered by the insurance, and those aged seventy 
and above are covered by separate health insurance, under which medical ser- 
vices are provided at minimal fixed cost. 
However, 1973 also saw the oil price hike and a deceleration of economic 250  Naohiro Yashiro and Takashi Oshio 
growth, ending the high-growth period of 10 percent average annual economic 
growth  prevailing  since  the  early  1950s. Moreover,  the  total  fertility  ratio 
started to decline again in 1975, from about 2.1 to 1.4 in 1996, while male and 
female life expectancy at age sixty-five has increased substantially, from 13.7 
and 16.6  years to 16.7 and 21.0 years, respectively. Both economic and demo- 
graphic factors have worked against the social security fiscal balance by reduc- 
ing the number of contributors and increasing beneficiaries and placing strong 
pressure on the system in the form of increasing fiscal deficits. 
The most recent public pension reform in  1994 was meant to mitigate the 
demographic pressure on the social security program. First, pension premiums 
are to be raised to a level slightly lower than 30 percent of monthly wages by 
the year 2025. Second, pension benefits are linked not to gross wages but to 
wages net of taxes and social security premiums; that is, the higher the taxes 
and social security premiums imposed on the working generation, the lower 
the pension  benefits  of  the retired, thus  balancing the equality between  the 
generations. Third, the eligibility age for the flat pension component of  the 
employees’ pension is scheduled to be raised from the current sixty to sixty- 
five beginning in 2001, one year every three years. 
6.2.2  Major Features of the Public Pension Scheme 
Japan’s public pension scheme consists basically  of  two pillars: one is the 
basic pension mainly for the self-employed and other nonemployees; the other 
is for employees in both the public and the private sectors. The pension benefits 
for employees consist of two parts: the basic pension, which they have in com- 
mon with the self-employed, and the earnings-related pension. 
The basic pension is mainly for the self-employed, unpaid family workers, 
and nonworkers (the unemployed, students age twenty or over, homemakers). 
It is a simple scheme based on a flat tax and a flat benefit structure, and it is 
managed by local authorities. It is organized on an individual-unit basis-that 
is, both husband and wife pay premiums and receive benefits individually- 
thus, there are benefits for neither dependent spouses nor survivors. The eligi- 
bility age is sixty-five, but one can collect the benefits as early as age sixty 
with a certain reduction in rates. The basic pension has little effect on retire- 
ment decisions mainly because the benefits are relatively  small (the average 
benefit was W3,OOO per month in 1995). Benefits are not subject to any earn- 
ings criteria. 
On the other hand, the pension schemes for employees are organized on a 
family-unit basis, and dependent  spouses are covered by  the pension of the 
head of the household. In addition, dependent spouses are provided as individ- 
uals with the basic pension from age sixty-five and survivor pension benefits, 
equivalent to two-thirds  of the full pension. The earnings-related pension is 
designed to maintain an individual’s standard of  living after retirement, and 
payments are proportional to contributions related to wages in the past, subject 
to a certain ceiling. The average amount  of  the benefits  was Y168,OOO  per 251  Social Security and Retirement in Japan 
month in 1995. Unlike the pension scheme for the self-employed, the employee 
pension can greatly affect the retirement decision of an individual, particularly 
at age sixty to sixty-four, when the benefits are reduced on the basis of  amount 
of earnings. Thus, in the following sections, our discussion will center around 
the pension schemes for employees. 
6.2.3  Pension Schemes for Employees 
There are eight public pension schemes covering various types of employ- 
ees, and the Kosei Nenkin Hoken (KNH, Employees Pension Insurance) domi- 
nates as the largest public pension  scheme for private-sector employees, cov- 
ering 85 percent  of  all employees. Thus, we  use the KNH to represent  the 
earnings-related pension for employees. The public pension for employees is 
financed by premiums that are paid by employees and employers in equal pro- 
portions, and the total premium paid was  16.5 percent of monthly wages’ in 
1995 (i.e., the employee and the employer paid 8.25 percent each). 
An  additional  contribution  of  8 percent  of  monthly  wages  is devoted  to 
health insurance for private-sector employees. The social security fund, con- 
sisting mostly of  pension funds and the surplus, equivalent to 3.5 percent of 
GDP in 1995, receives interest from the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program 
(FILP).I In addition, there are government transfers financed by  general taxes 
equivalent to one-third of the total benefits of the basic pension and administra- 
tive expenses.  Although the public pension fund is subsidized by the central gov- 
ernment, its budget is kept completely separate from the general budget, and the 
surplus in the pension fund cannot be used to reduce the government deficit. 
Eligibility  for a public  pension  is based on  age. All  individuals between 
twenty and fifty-nine years of age are obliged to participate in their respective 
public pension programs.  Most of  the contributions  (and income taxes) are 
automatically deducted from wages by  the company, except in certain small 
firms. However, those aged sixty and over are not automatically qualified  to 
enroll in a public pension  scheme even though they  may continue to 
Individual  pension  assets  can  be  transferred  to other  schemes when  one 
changes jobs,  as in  principle  an  individual  is  eligible  to  receive  only  one 
pension. 
6.2.4  Pension Benefits 
An  individual’s benefit  amount  is determined  by  the  following  steps. A 
worker’s monthly wages  (excluding semiannual bonuses)  are converted into 
3.  The monthly standard wage excludes semiannual bonuses, accounting for a quarter of annual 
earnings. The replacement rate of pension benefits to annual earnings is slightly below 50 percent, 
which is on a comparable basis to that prevailing in other OECD countries. 
4. FILP is the government financing program directed mainly at public infrastructures supported 
mainly by funds from the public pension funds and postal savings. FILP has played an important 
role in providing funds for social capital, particularly during the high-growth period. 
5. Even after age sixty-five, an individual can voluntarily contribute to the earnings-related pen- 
sion unless he already receives pension benefits. 252  Naohiro Yashiro and Takashi Oshio 
hyoujun houshuu getsugaku (HHG), the standard average monthly earnings), 
indexed by the national wage average. HHG is divided into thirty brackets that 
range from $92,000 to $590,000, This wage history is averaged over the em- 
ployee’s entire period of coverage up to age sixty-four. A particular characteris- 
tic of  the Japanese pension system is that the total length of the contributing 
periods for the earning-related portion of  the KNH is not fixed (regardless of 
how many years one has worked) and that only a limitation on age (age sixty- 
five) exists.6 
In this sense, the additional years’ work plays an  important role in increasing 
the benefits in the earning-related component of the employee’s pension. For 
example, a worker who left his firm at age sixty and continues to work in 
another firm at much lower wages can still increase his pension benefits as the 
positive effect on the pension benefits from an additional year of  work will 
more than offset the negative effect arising from the lowered average contri- 
bution. 
Workers can claim KNH benefits at the normal retirement age of sixty-five, 
before the full pension is granted at age sixty-five. Between the ages of sixty 
and sixty-four, the payment of pension benefits is subject to an earnings test 
(see below). Beyond age sixty-five, the recipient is eligible to receive the full 
pension with no earnings test and has the option of delaying receipt of the full 
pension. For workers reaching age sixty-five in 1996, an additional 12 percent 
of pension benefits is paid for each year that the collection of benefits is de- 
layed. This amount will steadily increase until the additional rate reaches 88 
percent at age seventy. 
6.2.5  The Zaishoku (Early Retirement) Pension 
While one can claim the zaishoku pension benefits as early as age sixty, the 
receipt of social security benefits is conditional on passing the “earnings test” 
on wages (but not on other income or assets) until age sixty-five. This scheme 
corresponds to the early retirement systems in many other OECD countries. 
That is, if  one earns more than a certain floor level, social security benefits 
(PENW,) are reduced for each additional dollar of earnings (W,)  until, at high 
earnings, one may not qualify at all. For example, if an individual earns even 
a small amount, the benefits are automatically reduced by 20 percent. Benefits 
are reduced for any earnings above Y220,OOO per month by  50 percent of the 
full pension benefits (PENF60) for each additional increment of earnings. Ben- 
efits are reduced by  100 percent for anyone who earns more than Y340,000.7 
The formula is 
6.  There is a maximum number of years of  contributions-forty-in  the flat pension for the 
self-employed. 
7. This rate of  reduction of pension benefits with higher wages has been lowered substantially 
since 1995 to prevent it from acting as a disincentive for older workers, but a de facto 50 percent 
effective income tax still remains. 253  Social Security and Retirement in Japan 
PENY = PENF60  for y  = 0, 
= 0.8 x  PENF60  for 0 <  W; < 22 - 0.8 x  PENF60, 
= 11 - v/2  + 0.4  x  PENF60  for  22 - 0.8 
x PENF60  < U: < 34, 
= 28 - v0.4 x  PENF60  for  34 < U: < 28 + 0.4 x  PENF60, 
= 0  for 28 + 0.4  x  PENF60  < v. 
These thresholds on the earnings test increase every five years with average 
earnings in the economy. 
6.2.6  The Full Pension 
The full KNH pension for which one is eligible at age sixty-five is generous 
by international standards. First, the pension benefits are not subject to an earn- 
ing tests, and even full-time workers can receive full pension benefits. Second, 
no contributions from the earnings of those age sixty-five and over are required 
even if the individuals concerned are working full time. Third, income tax law 
favors pension benefits over earnings, and most benefit recipients are exempt 
from income taxes. Thus, receiving full pension benefits at age sixty-five does 
not exert much influence on retirement decisions. 
6.2.7  Benefits to Dependent Spouses 
There are additional pension benefit provisions for those who have depen- 
dent families. Dependent spouses of social security beneficiaries receive addi- 
tional benefits: the kukyu (a supplementary pension), the dependent spouse’s 
own basic pension, and survivor benefik8  First, kukyu pension benefits for the 
dependent spouse are Y226,OOO per year; the same amount is provided for the 
first two dependent children under the age of  eighteen and Y75,300 for any 
younger children9  Second, dependent spouses are entitled to their own basic 
pension from age sixty-five with no additional contributions, unlike singles or 
economically independent spouses with the same income levels. This measure 
protects dependent spouses who divorce at older ages and have no individual 
pension on which to rely. Third, surviving spouses receive three-quarters of 
full  pension  benefits, beginning  at  age sixty. Dependent children, parents, 
grandchildren, and grandparents are eligible for these benefits as well. 
The situation involving dependent spouses who have their own earnings is 
somewhat complicated because they therefore are entitled to pensions based 
8. A dependent spouse is one who earns less than Y1.3 million annually and is not obliged to 
pay premiums. 
9. The frikae (replacement) pension benefit is replaced by  the kukyu pension when dependent 
spouses reach age sixty-five. The kakyu pension benefit is a temporary provision for older persons 
and is subject to a reduction in rates based on year of birth. The more recently the spouse was born, 
the less she receives, and those born after 1965 receive nothing. 254  Naohiro Yashim and Takashi Oshio 
on their own contributions. Economically independent spouses are obliged to 
choose between survival benefits and their own pension benefits. Since 1995, 
however, they have had the option of receiving half of each.’O This raises equal- 
ity issues about possibly significant differences in the lifetime pension benefits 
collected by workers who have the same level of earnings but who may or may 
not have dependent  spouses because, beyond  a certain  income ceiling, they 
lose various pension benefits granted to nonworking homemakers. In addition, 
the system may well discourage dependent spouses from working full-time. 
Indeed, several studies indicate that dependent  spouses deliberately restrain 
their annual earnings in order to maintain their status (Higuchi 1995). 
6.2.8  Disability Pension 
The disability pension is the income that workers physically unable to par- 
ticipate in the  labor market will  receive  to  sustain their  standard of  living. 
Those who qualify for the disability pension are eligible to receive benefits 
regardless of age after age twenty. The benefits are calculated in a similar way 
to retirement pensions, and additional benefits of 25 percent are provided to 
those who are considered to have a major disability. Also, one can collect a 
disability basic  pension  amounting  to Y785,500 per  year  regardless  of  the 
length of  contributing periods. One can choose either of two disability pen- 
sions. 
In 1994, 285,000 people received a disability pension (3 percent of old age 
pension recipients), and the average benefit was Y102,OOO per month (60 per- 
cent of  average old age pension benefits). Eligibility conditions for the disabil- 
ity pension are strict. Most disabilities must originate in injuries, and physical 
disabilities that occur with aging are not sufficient. Thus, in Japan, disability 
pensions cannot be used to finance earlier retirement, as such pensions can be 
in several European countries. 
6.2.9  Hazard Rate 
An effective indicator of the effects of the country-specific social security 
system on labor force participation trends is the “hazard rate” out of the labor 
force for men and women. This is measured as the increase from the previous 
age of those leaving the labor force relative to the stock of workers participat- 
ing at the previous age. However, this indicator is susceptible to age-by-age 
population changes and is not an appropriate measure to use when examining 
the exit pattern of older persons in Japan. 
Thus, we show instead an alternative hazard rate out of the labor force in 
terms of participation rates-the  percentage point changes in the participation 
rates from the previous year-for  men and women (fig. 6.12). We see a large 
10. A rationale for this adjustment is that both survivor benefits and own pension benefits are 
subsidized by  the government and receiving two  subsidies instead of  one is considered  unfair. 
Households in which both husband and wife work were not nearly as prevalent at the time the 
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Fig. 6.12  Hazard rate out of the labor force (differences  in labor force 
participation ratio) 
jump at age sixty for men. This is obviously the result of the general practice 
of mandatory retirement. However, it also suggests that social security has a 
role in explaining the retirement behavior of men as sixty is the age of eligibil- 
ity for the earlier retirement social security benefit, just as in the United States. 
In addition, there is another jump at age sixty-five, which corresponds to the 
eligibility age for receiving the full pension benefit without the earnings-test 
criteria. On the other hand, because many women in their fifties are part-time 
workers and social security benefits do not work as retirement incentives for 
older women, the jump at age sixty is less pronounced for women since retire- 
ment for women rising consistently through the fifties. 
6.3  Survey of  Previous Studies 
Few empirical studies have been conducted in Japan concerning the interac- 
tion between social security benefits and retirement. This discussion draws on 
Takayama (1992), Seike (1993), and Tachibanaki and Shimono (1994). First, 
Takayama (1  992) used the micro-data set from the National Survey on Family 
Income and Expenditure  (1984) to estimate pension  wealth and analyze the 
redistributional effects of the public pension. Takayama (1992) also examined 
the probability of  retirement for dependent employees with various classes of 
pension benefits in the age group sixty to sixty-four, finding a significant nega- 
tive relation. Moreover, the marginal effect of an increase in benefits on retire- 
ment is large for individuals at the low end of the benefit range. Similar results 
have been obtained by Tachibanaki and Shimono (1994). 
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the pension wealth of an average employee having a dependent spouse and its 
annual changes. He found that changes in pension wealth as a proportion of 
annual earnings before retirement became negative at age sixty, when pension 
benefits are provided. This is consistent with a large drop in labor force partici- 
pation. However, as Seike conceives social security wealth, premiums are not 
subtracted. Also, the expected value of the survivor pension is not taken into 
account as his concept of pension wealth is individual based, compared with 
ours, which accounts for the expected benefits of the wife. Further, there is 
room for argument as to the extent to which the concept of  social security 
wealth should be broadened; we take a wider view, one that accounts for vari- 
ous factors affecting the retirement decision of an individual, including wage 
subsidies specific to the age group sixty to sixty-four. 
6.4  Retirement Incentives 
In this section, we use a representative household to assess the incentives of 
social security benefits on retirement through accrual rate effects; we also test 
variations under alternative assumptions. A major reform of the Japanese pub- 
lic pension scheme was introduced in 1994, but in this section we analyze the 
effects of the situation prevailing before the 1994 reform, postponing discus- 
sion of the effects of the 1994 reform until the country-specific analysis pro- 
vided in section 6.5 below. 
6.4.1  Modeling Social Security Benefits 
In Japan, the Social Security Administration’s official data that record the 
individual history of wage earnings and social security tax payments are not 
available to us. Thus, we use instead data reported in published sources. The 
basis for our analysis is the Basic Wage Survey by the Ministry of Labor. This 
survey is published annually, and each firm submits a report with data indicat- 
ing the average worker’s wage, age, years of work experience at the particular 
firm, and education as well as firm size, occupation, and industry. We  apply 
the average monthly wage of a worker in the following way. 
We present a typical Japanese household, headed by a man age sixty-five in 
1995 (born on 1 April 1930 as the social security data are collected on a fiscal 
year basis, i.e., from April to March in the following year, in Japan) whose wife 
was born in 1933 and has no work experience. He is a high school graduate (as 
are about 50 percent of the male employees in 1995) and worked in the same 
firm from age twenty until the normal retirement age of sixty. At age sixty, he 
left that firm and started to work in another. We  assume that he worked full- 
time in both firms. The couple’s children are already grown and are now eco- 
nomically independent. This household head  works for a typical Japanese 
company and is covered by the Kosei Nenkin Hoken (KNH) plan, the largest 
public pension scheme for private-sector employees (covering 85 and 71 per- 
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There are other public pensions for employees in the public sector and specific 
groups of the private sector with different pension contributions and benefits 
schemes, but these are not considered here. Our household head is eligible for 
three components of KNH: the basic component, the earnings-related compo- 
nent, and the additional component for a dependent wife. Firm pensions and 
private pensions are not considered here. 
On the basis of the assumptions outlined above, the following steps are nec- 
essary  to compute social security  wealth,  which is the expected net present 
value of social security benefits through the individual’s lifetime. 
First, we derive the wage profile of a typical worker whose characteristics 
are given above. Since panel data are not available, we simply assume that the 
historical wage profile of an individual traces the same wage profile pattern in 
a given year adjusted by inflation, which is the same method taken by Seike 
(1993). 
Second, the wage data contained in the Basic Wage Survey are adjusted to 
the scales of the standard wages on which the pension premium and benefits 
are based. The monthly social security benefits are the sum of  the following 
components: (1) a fixed component, which is a certain unit price multiplied by 
the number of years worked, set at a maximum of 444 months; (2) years of 
contributions (which do not account for years of unemployment); (3) the base 
wage rate; and (4) an adjustment for a dependent spouse. 
Third, the pension premium is imposed on the base wage, which is monthly 
wages including overtime payments but excluding bonuses. Thus, the wage 
data contained in the Basic Wage Survey are adjusted to a pension premium 
basis. In addition, the adjusted wage profiles are deflated by the historical wage 
series  in  the  Ministry  of  Labor’s  Maitsuki  Kinrotokei  Chousa  (Survey  of 
Monthly Wages). We add both the employee’s and the employer’s share of the 
pension  premiums, under the assumption  that the employer’s share is fully 
borne by the worker, for example, in the form of lower wages. 
Using these procedures, we derive social security wealth (SSW), social se- 
curity accrual (SSA), and taxeshbsidies, explaining the worker’s retirement 
incentives. The average life expectancy is based on the Japan life tables from 
the Population Research Institute,  Ministry  of  Health and Welfare, adjusting 
for the sedage-specific mortality  rate. Note that we use the  “unconditional 
mortality risk” beyond age fifty-five, which is tantamount to disregarding the 
probability of death at each year after the fifty-fifth birthday.” We use this un- 
conditional mortality  assumption because, at the time of the computation of 
social security wealth, it is reasonable to base an analysis on the perspective of 
the forward-looking individual who, at age fifty-four, is considering retirement 
incentives at all future ages. In the base case, we use a real discount rate of 
3 percent. 
11. An alternative assumption is to vary  the conditional mortality risk on the basis of the year 
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6.4.2  Social Security Wealth 
Social security wealth is the net discounted  sum of lifetime pensions  and 
other benefits at age fifty-five. We subtract the pension premiums that the indi- 
vidual would  pay during any continued  work  and compute an expected  net 
present value of social security wealth. Social security wealth is the sum of the 
expected pension  benefits  not  only to  an individual  but  also to his spouse, 
including  the  zaishoku  (earlier  retirement)  pension,  the full pension  at age 
sixty-five, the addition for dependent spouses, survivor benefits, and the indi- 
vidual basic pension for dependent spouses aged sixty-five and over. The last 
benefit needs some additional explanation, since a dependent spouse is eligible 
for the basic pension  on her own and it is not paid to the household  head. 
Nevertheless, we include the pension benefits of the dependent spouse when 
determining the social security wealth of the household head as we did with 
survivor benefits.  In  addition,  wage  subsidies  are  added  to social  security 
wealth after the 1994 reform. 
Comparing the discounted values of social security wealth at different ages, 
however, is not enough to predict the retirement decision. The accrual rate for 
work in a given year, which is the change in the worker’s future social security 
benefits relative to what he would earn over the coming year, also figures in an 
individual’s decision whether to work another year. Thus, social security ac- 
crual is defined as the difference in social security wealth:  SSA, = SSW, - 
Social security accrual is presented as a ratio, that is, the percentage change 
in social security wealth. Also, the change in social security wealth (i.e., social 
security accrual) relative to projected  earnings over that year is defined as a 
taxhbsidy  rate. If the change in social security wealth associated with an ad- 
ditional year of  work is negative, the effect is that  of  a tax  on work. If  the 
change is positive, the effect is that of a subsidy to work. 
6.4.3 
ssw,-,  . 
Specific Characteristics of Retirement Incentives in Japan 
The following two points about labor market conditions must be taken ac- 
count of in any discussion of the retirement incentives of older persons in Ja- 
pan. First, after retirement at age sixty, the wages of older persons tend to fall 
substantially-by  40 percent, on average-from  the preretirement level. This 
is mainly because wages in the primary firm-the  “internal labor market”- 
are seniority based while those with the new firm-the  “external market”- 
are close to flat. Thus, unlike in the United States, the preretirement wage is 
not a realistic reference for the opportunity costs of one’s retirement. We as- 
sume that this diminishing wage profile (which older persons over age sixty 
actually face) reflects the actual labor market situation in the base-case simu- 
lation. 
Second, older persons between the ages of  sixty and sixty-four can claim 
the zaishoku pension, and these benefits are dependent on wages. When wages 259  Social Security and Retirement in Japan 
are sufficiently low, the individual can receive both wages and pension bene- 
fits, subject to an earnings test. Thus, when deciding to work at that age, the 
individual compares a full-time wage, on the one hand, with a part-time wage 
and pension benefits, on the other. Also, at age sixty-five and beyond, individu- 
als are eligible to receive a full pension with no earnings criteria; that is, full 
pension benefits are unconditional, and no premium is required. 
6.4.4  The Base Case 
The results of the base-case  simulation are summarized in table 6.1.  Each 
row represents the age of the worker in the last year he works. For example, 
the row for age fifty-four represents the effect of working until age fifty-four 
and retiring on the fifty-fifth birthday. 
The first column shows the replacement rate, which is conventionally  de- 
fined as the ratio of pension benefits to preretirement wage earnings. This con- 
cept is irrelevant until the worker can actually claim pension benefits, which 
occurs when his last year of  work is fifty-nine and he retires on his sixtieth 
birthday. When he becomes eligible to claim a pension, the replacement rate is 
about 55 percent. This rate jumps to 80 percent in his sixtieth year because the 
preretirement  wage-the  denominator of  the replacement  rate-drops  sub- 
stantially after the mandatory retirement age of sixty. 
The large drop in the replacement rate at age sixty-four is due to the fact 
that, after the sixty-fifth birthday, pension benefits are not conditional on an 
earnings test and the worker need not pay any pension premiums. He will see 
a small jump in the rate in his sixty-seventh year, when his wife, who is three 
years his junior, becomes eligible for her basic pension benefit. 
Table 6.1  Base-Case Incentive Calculations 
Last Year  Replacement  ssw  Accrual  Accrual  Tax/ 
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The next three columns show the evolution of social security wealth over 
time. If the worker retires on his sixtieth birthday, the net present value of his 
social security wealth would be Y35.7 million. Social security wealth increases 
up to his sixtieth birthday because he cannot claim any benefits until then. If 
he works another year, however, social security wealth falls by  1.8 percent. 
Thus, for this individual, the public pension system is “actuarially unfair” as it 
penalizes work beyond age sixty by reducing future social security benefits. 
Social security wealth is unchanged beyond  age sixty-five because, as men- 
tioned above, there are no more contributions or opportunity costs for postpon- 
ing retirement. 
Social security accrual is the change in social security wealth from the previ- 
ous period. Between the ages of fifty-five and fifty-nine, social security accrual 
is positive-an  additional year of work gradually raises social security wealth 
with longer contribution periods, and this exceeds the negative effects of addi- 
tional pension premiums. However, as the worker is eligible for the zaishoku 
pension benefits from age sixty, additional work until age sixty-four incurs the 
opportunity costs of a delay in claiming the benefits. In addition, the higher 
the earnings received, the more the pension benefits are reduced. For example, 
the benefits of the base-case  worker are reduced by half. As a result, the so- 
cial security accrual rate is negative; there is roughly a 2 percent decline in so- 
cial security wealth each year due to continued work. Social security accrual 
becomes zero beyond  age sixty-five, reflecting  no change in  social security 
wealth. 
The final column shows the taxhubsidy rate. The taxhbsidy rate is the 
ratio of change in social security wealth to projected  earnings over that year. 
The negative  sign here indicates a subsidy, implying that a worker receives 
more than an actuarial adjustment for delaying his benefit claims and paying 
additional  pension  premiums.  The worker  keeps  getting  subsidies to work 
through his sixtieth birthday, but, beyond that point, he is forced to pay taxes 
on work through age sixty-four. This is because he loses social security benefits 
by  continuing to work; besides, the pension benefits of  most individuals are 
not taxed, while wages are. If a worker decides to work between the ages of 
sixty and sixty-four, forgone social security wealth amounts to nearly one-third 
of a year’s earnings. This significant shift from subsidy to tax at age sixty is a 
major cause of the large drop in labor force participation. There is, however, 
no such tax disincentive effect beyond age sixty-five. 
6.4.5  Other Cases 
Table 6.2  shows these results  for a single worker. The negative effect of 
delayed retirement is larger for a  single than  for a married  worker. This is 
mainly because the single worker has no survivors and receives no other bene- 
fits for a dependent spouse (even though the premiums paid are equal given 
the same earnings). The social security wealth of a single worker at age fifty- 
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Table 6.2  Incentive Calculations-Single  Worker 
Last Year  Replacement  ssw  Accrual  Accrual  Tax I 
of Work  Rate  (thousand yen)  (thousand yen)  Rate  Subsidy 
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less,  the  difference  in  social  security  accrual  between  the  married  and the 
single individual is not very  significant. This is due mainly to the fact that, 
while the social security wealth of the married worker at age sixty is much 
larger than that of a single worker, the change in social security benefits by 
working another year is almost exactly the same for the married and the single 
individual since the additional benefit for a spouse is largely fixed. The larger 
tax on the single worker, however, indicates that he will lose more from his 
decision to continue work than his married counterpart. 
The incentive  mechanism vanes by  wage level. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show 
the effects of considering different earning histories for a married worker: We 
compare a worker at the ninetieth percentile of the earnings distribution (table 
6.3) with a worker at the tenth percentile (table 6.4).’*  According to tables 6.3 
and 6.4, the replacement rate is higher for the low-earnings worker. Also, the 
tax rate on the low-wage  earner is twice that of the high-wage earner. This 
implies the redistributional mechanism in the basic pension (the fixed compo- 
nent), through which the low-wage earner loses more relative to his wage earn- 
ings by postponing retirement than does the high-wage earner. 
Table 6.5 considers a different permutation  to the earnings history  for a 
worker who has an incomplete earnings history. Compared with the base case, 
where the worker has contributed for forty years at age sixty, the worker in this 
case is assumed to have started working five years later; he therefore needs to 
work an additional five years to be eligible for full pension benefits. According 
12. Wages for these workers are obtained from the 1994 age/earnings profile. 262  Naohiro Yashiro and Takashi Oshio 
Table 6.3  Incentive Calculations-Ninetieth  Percentile Earnings 
Last Year  Replacement  ssw  Accrual  Accrual  Tax / 
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Table 6.4  Incentive Calculations-Tenth  Percentile Earnings 
Last Year  Replacement  ssw  Accrual  Accrual  Tax/ 





























































































to this table, the tax for working an additional year at ages sixty to sixty-four 
is less for the worker with an incomplete earnings history. 
Figure 6.13 shows the time-series pattern of taxes odsubsidies to continued 
work for the base case and these two permutations of  the different earnings 
histories. The subsidy is larger for the low-wage earner at ages under sixty. 
From age sixty to age sixty-four, there is a substantial tax on an additional year Table 6.5  Incentive Calculations-Incomplete  Earnings History 
0.4-- 
0.3-- 
Last Year  Replacement  ssw  Accrual  Accrual  Tax I 
of Work  Rate  (thousand yen)  (thousand yen)  Rate  Subsidy 
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.....  Base Case  --- 10th Percentile Earnings  -  90th Percentile Earnings 
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Table 6.6  Incentive Calculations-Summary  of Other Cases for Last Year of 
Work Is Age 60 
ssw  Accrual 
Replacement  (thousand  (thousand  Accrual  Tax I 
Case  Rate  yen)  yen)  Rate  Subsidy 
Base case  ,800  35,018  -644  -.018  .338 
Single worker  .75  1  21,164  -700  -  ,032  ,376 
90th percentile  ,618  41,178  -729  -.017  ,244 
10th percentile  ,735  30,169  -  1,257  -  ,040  .671 
Incomplete history  ,581  24,533  -131  -  .005  ,079 
of work on the small base of earnings at the tenth percentile. Also, table 6.6 
summarizes various incentive calculations. 
6.5  Country-Specific Issues 
6.5.1  Lump-Sum Severance Payments 
In Japan, one can get a substantial amount in severance payments when leav- 
ing a company. For example, a typical college graduate working at the same 
firm for thirty-five years receives a lump-sum payment equivalent to forty-eight 
months of wages in 1994, which is partly substitutable with the firm's pension. 
Usually, the amount increases with more years of service up to a certain num- 
ber of years. However, the increase in the lump-sum payments becomes mar- 
ginal when the worker is in his fifties, and the net gain from it declines over 
time. Many Japanese firms encourage earlier retirement by  increasing lump- 
sum payments with  a rate of the increase that declines with age. Also, they 
give higher payments to those employees who voluntarily leave the firm before 
the normal retirement age (Seike 1997). 
6.5.2  Wage Subsidies 
Another social insurance benefit  that potentially  interacts with the public 
pension program is the wage subsidies to working older persons, a program 
established in 1994 as part of the unemployment insurance scheme. The wage 
subsidy program intends to shift the recipients of unemployment  insurance; 
beginning at age sixty, one can be eligible for a wage subsidy for as long as 
five years,  compared  to the  maximum  three  hundred  days for  which  older 
people can receive unemployment insurance. These subsidies of 25 percent of 
the current wage (W,)  are provided to those who are aged sixty to sixty-four 
years and receive a wage that is at least 15 percent lower than their wage at the 
(normal retirement) age of sixty (WJ,  subject to a certain wage ~ei1ing.I~ 
13. The wage subsidy program was introduced in order to encourage older persons who receive 
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Wage subsidies (sub) to these older workers are determined on the basis of 
the following formulas: 
sub = 0.25 x  u:  for  u:  < 0.64  x  W,, 
= (13.6 x  W, - 16Y)/21 
=  0  for  0.85 x  W,  < Y. 
for  0.64 x  W,  < u: < 0.85  x  W,, 
The first formula is the one that potentially applies to most older persons as 
their wages after mandatory retirement fall by about half on average. 
The wage subsidy program is an entirely different scheme from the public 
pension, but its economic implications are similar to those of  the zaishoku 
pensions for those aged sixty to sixty-four. Both are available to the same age 
group and are subject to certain earnings criteria, thus affecting retirement de- 
cisions, We  treat this wage subsidy in the same way  as we do pension premi- 
ums; both affect social security wealth, though in opposite directions. As the 
wage subsidy of 25 percent well exceeds the employee’s share of pension pre- 
miums (8.25 percent), the combined effects would increase the net public pen- 
sion assets of an individual. 
6.5.3 
In Japan, there was a major revision of the public pension scheme as well 
as of employment insurance in 1994. These two reforms are expected to have 
a desirable effect on work incentives for the elderly. First, the reform in the 
zaishoku (on-the-job) pension has lowered the “tax effect” on work for those 
aged sixty to sixty-four. Roughly speaking, after the 1994 reform, the worker 
with an additional two dollars in earnings will lose one dollar of pension bene- 
fits, instead of the two dollars he would have lost before the reform. Second, 
the wage subsidy equivalent to 25 percent of  wage earnings is given to the 
same age group up to a certain ceiling of earnings. However, the wage subsi- 
dies are scheduled to be revised in  1998: for those who receive both a wage 
subsidy and pension benefits, an amount equivalent to 10 percent of wages is 
to be deducted from the pension benefits. We  have already accounted for this 
revision in our calculations of taxes/subsidies after the 1994 reform. 
As a result of  the 1994 reform, the tax rate for an  individual working an 
additional year at age sixty is estimated to have been lowered to approximately 
one-third of the prereform level (see table 6.7 as well as fig. 6.14). These two 
reforms in the social insurance schemes should reduce the disincentive effect 
of  the  public  pension  and  stimulate the labor force participation of  older 
persons. 
Effects of the 1994 Pension Reform 
6.6  Conclusion 
This study reveals the incentive mechanism whereby the public pension af- 
fects the retirement decisions made in the Japanese labor market, a mechanism Table 6.7  Base-Case Incentive Calculations (after 1994 reform) 
Last Year  Replacement  ssw  Accrual  Accrual  TaXl 
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that has much in common  with those in the United States and other OECD 
countries. Pension benefits are designed to be “actuarially unfair,” and the deci- 
sion to  work  between  the ages of  sixty and sixty-four  is penalized.  As the 
population is aging rapidly, it is wasteful to maintain such a disincentive mech- 
anism. This study indicates the need to reform the public pension  scheme to 
restore an actuarially fair principle. 
Even given the disincentive effect outlined above, the labor market participa- 
tion of older Japanese persons is quite high by international standards, and the 
trend toward earlier retirement has changed recently. This is partly due to the 
fact that there are a significant number of self-employed persons in their sixties 
in the labor market. Also, the sustained demand for labor should have helped 
raise the labor force participation rate of older persons. But the fact that the 
public pension is designed on more generous lines in Japan than in other indus- 
trialized countries is also important; for example, after age sixty-five, no more 
contributions or any earnings tests are required to determine eligibility for ben- 
efits. This partly explains why the labor market participation rate of older Japa- 
nese persons is high. The 1994 pension reform, which both mitigates the tax 
effect on the earlier retirement pension scheme and introduces a wage subsidy 
scheme, would further reduce the size in the expected loss in social security 
wealth with continued work between the ages of sixty and sixty-four, thus pos- 
sibly stimulating older persons to work. 
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